Tech Monopoly
Essays by Herbert Hovenkamp on monopoly power, mergers and refusals to deal in technology markets. 6 essays since 11 September 2024.
The essays
Newest first- No. 6
26 March 2026Fairness and Redistribution in Antitrust Law
Many parts of the legal system are devoted to promoting “fair” outcomes in the distribution of wealth or economic status. Antitrust law is not among them. The antitrust statutes authorize the courts to pursue practices that reduce output (“restrain trade”) or threaten monopoly…
- No. 5
15 December 2025The Enigmas of Monopoly Power
Market power can be assessed in antitrust cases by two methods often described as “alternatives”. For unilateral conduct, however, they are inconsistent. Courts insist on market shares well above 50%, which entails that only one firm can be a monopolist.
- No. 4
14 July 2025The U.S. Supreme Court and the Merger Efficiency “Defense”
Firms’ principal motives for merging are not to increase market power, but rather to improve firm outcomes through changes in internal operations or structure. Of the 17000+ mergers that occur annually in the U.S., 90% or more have no expectation of an anticompetitive price…
- No. 3
11 March 2025Antitrust’s Forensic Tools
Most areas of law enforcement require investigative tools to provide evidence of violations and harm. Antitrust law’s single-minded focus on prices, output, and innovation explains its selection of economic tools.
- No. 2
18 October 2024How IP Rights Create Competition in E-commerce
In the offline economy, IP was often seen as creating or protecting monopoly; in online commerce it frequently makes competition possible.
- No. 1
11 September 2024Antitrust and Digital Refusals to Deal
Early in 2024 the United States Department of Justice accused Apple of monopolizing a market for “performance smartphones” by refusing to share features that have placed the iPhone in the performance category.