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Spring 2025

The Network Law Review publishes four issues a year. Articles go online one by one and are gathered by season. This issue closed with 16 publications.

Contents

Newest first
  1. 18 June 2025

    Towards Efficient Data Sharing in Platform Markets

    Bertin Martens, Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne

    Platforms collect valuable data that they do not share. Welfare then suffers as information asymmetry produces market failures. Current proposals to address this, however, fail because they grant access to an entity’s own data but not the context within which it functions.

    Read Towards Efficient Data Sharing in Platform MarketsCite Towards Efficient Data Sharing in Platform Markets

  2. 13 June 2025

    On Simple Competition Policy

    Keith N. Hylton

    These remarks address the topic of “simple competition policy for a complex world”. There is much to be said in favor of simplicity in legal rules. Complex legal rules are often difficult for the individuals who must comply with the rules to understand what they mean.

    Read On Simple Competition PolicyCite On Simple Competition Policy

  3. 11 June 2025

    Antitrust In the Digital Era: A Contextual and Fact-Based Approach

    Lars Kjølbye

    The current European antitrust policy framework was conceived more than two decades ago in a very different economic and political environment. The economy was anchored in the industrial era. Market positions were driven largely by production capacity, efficiency and incremental innovation.

    Read Antitrust In the Digital Era: A Contextual and Fact-Based ApproachCite Antitrust In the Digital Era: A Contextual and Fact-Based Approach

  4. 10 June 2025

    Brazilian Merger Policy in Digital Markets: What Can We Expect in 2025?

    Juliana Oliveira Domingues

    Brazil has engaged in extensive discussions regarding new approaches for reviewing mergers and acquisitions in digital markets. In 2024, the Secretariat for Economic Reforms at the Ministry of Finance (MF) introduced new proposals that reignited this debate.

    Read Brazilian Merger Policy in Digital Markets: What Can We Expect in 2025?Cite Brazilian Merger Policy in Digital Markets: What Can We Expect in 2025?

  5. 9 June 2025

    Ecosystems in Competition Law: A U.S. Perspective

    Christopher S. Yoo

    The aptly titled panel on “Competition Policy towards Ecosystems: The Need for Clear Theories of Harm and Efficiencies” at the 2nd Annual DCI Conference held at the European University Institute on October 21–22, 2024, provided a timely opportunity to assess the impact of ecosystem-based theories…

    Read Ecosystems in Competition Law: A U.S. PerspectiveCite Ecosystems in Competition Law: A U.S. Perspective

  6. 6 June 2025

    A New Paradigm for Antitrust in the Digital Sector

    Diana L. Moss

    Competition policy has a difficult relationship with the digital sector. Rates of innovation and productivity are some of the highest across the U.S. economy and ongoing advancements in technology (e.g., artificial intelligence (AI)) threaten to displace incumbent business models.

    Read A New Paradigm for Antitrust in the Digital SectorCite A New Paradigm for Antitrust in the Digital Sector

  7. 5 June 2025

    Dynamic Capabilities and EC Merger Control: A Difficult Match?

    Svend Albaek and Raphaël De Coninck

    There is no doubt that competition authorities in the future will give a higher role to innovation – and dynamic effects in general – in merger control. As the Draghi Report puts it: “The economy has shifted towards more innovation-heavy sectors where competition is usually based on digital…

    Read Dynamic Capabilities and EC Merger Control: A Difficult Match?Cite Dynamic Capabilities and EC Merger Control: A Difficult Match?

  8. 4 June 2025

    Merger Enforcement in the High-Tech Economy: The Role for a Dynamic Capabilities Framework

    Richard J. Gilbert

    Scholars, including Teece et al. (1997), Sidak and Teece (2009), Murmann and Vogt (2023), and Petit et al. (2024), have argued that antitrust enforcement makes systematic errors by failing to recognize and evaluate dynamic capabilities for innovation.

    Read Merger Enforcement in the High-Tech Economy: The Role for a Dynamic Capabilities FrameworkCite Merger Enforcement in the High-Tech Economy: The Role for a Dynamic Capabilities Framework

  9. 3 June 2025

    Lessons From Empirical Work on Market Dynamics

    Ariel Pakes

    There have been many advances in the dynamics analysis of markets since the mid 1990’s; largely facilitated by prior developments in theory (both economic and econometric) and the increased availability of computer power (both for facilitation of computations and for the generation of data).

    Read Lessons From Empirical Work on Market DynamicsCite Lessons From Empirical Work on Market Dynamics

  10. 2 June 2025

    Did Enforcers Make the Right Call When Clearing Google/Doubleclick?

    Christian Bergqvist

    Google’s activities in the Ad Tech Industry have come under intense fire as the company stands accused, in several jurisdictions, of manipulating the sale of online display advertising space.

    Read Did Enforcers Make the Right Call When Clearing Google/Doubleclick?Cite Did Enforcers Make the Right Call When Clearing Google/Doubleclick?

  11. 30 May 2025

    The Growing Complexity of Digital Economies over the GenAI Waterfall: Challenges and Policy Implications

    Volker Stocker and William Lehr

    The GenAI genie is out of the bottle. AI, and its vanguard GenAI, is a change agent that profoundly impacts the global transition to a digital economy. GenAI is already percolating through businesses and tasks, transforming how we create, innovate, and consume content (information), products, and…

    Read The Growing Complexity of Digital Economies over the GenAI Waterfall: Challenges and Policy ImplicationsCite The Growing Complexity of Digital Economies over the GenAI Waterfall: Challenges and Policy Implications

  12. 29 May 2025

    Dynamic Capabilities Analysis and Merger Control: Is A Long-Delayed Convergence Finally on The Way?

    Frédéric Jenny

    Merger control has been traditionally focused on the impact of the structural changes induced by the mergers examined on the incentives of the merging parties. Agencies have also long considered the risks that increased market power for the merging parties could lead directly or indirectly to a…

    Read Dynamic Capabilities Analysis and Merger Control: Is A Long-Delayed Convergence Finally on The Way?Cite Dynamic Capabilities Analysis and Merger Control: Is A Long-Delayed Convergence Finally on The Way?

  13. 12 May 2025

    Neo-Brandeisianism: A Policy at War With Itself

    Thomas A. Lambert

    “Neo-Brandeisian” scholars contend that prevailing antitrust law fails to protect democratic values. They propose (1) replacing antitrust’s consumer welfare standard with a multi-goaled approach and (2) embracing ex-ante conduct rules over ex-post liability standards.

    Read Neo-Brandeisianism: A Policy at War With ItselfCite Neo-Brandeisianism: A Policy at War With Itself

  14. 1 May 2025

    Fueling Concentration: AI Agents and Network Effects

    Raz Agranat and Michal S. Gal

    AI agents lie at the frontier of the evolving AI economy, functioning as applications that autonomously execute tasks on users’ behalf. While contemporary discourse on market concentration in AI ecosystems predominantly focuses on data access asymmetries, this paper examines the susceptibility of…

    Read Fueling Concentration: AI Agents and Network EffectsCite Fueling Concentration: AI Agents and Network Effects

  15. 14 April 2025

    Antitrust Antidote: January-March 2025

    Jeremy Sandford and Koren W. Wong-Ervin

    There were a number of decisions from January through March 2025, including (1) a motion to dismiss the decision in the Apple iCloud case involving issues such as “negative tying” arrangements, single-brand aftermarkets, and statute of limitations; (2) the FTC’s loss in the vertical merger of…

    Read Antitrust Antidote: January-March 2025Cite Antitrust Antidote: January-March 2025