Welcome to the Antitrust Antidote—a quarterly publication analyzing significant U.S. antitrust decisions from legal and economic perspectives. Authored by former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcer Koren W. Wong-Ervin, former FTC economists Jeremy Sandford and Nathan Wilson, and antitrust litigator Jeremy Kauffman. The title of this series, “Antitrust Antidote,” while mostly meant to be humorous (perhaps limited to those who have heard Koren’s “let’s talk economics” as a cure for a bad day), also refers to the practical guidance we aim to provide throughout the series. We hope you enjoy it!
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There were a number of significant decisions from April through June 2026, including: (1) the Eastern District of California’s preliminary injunction in In re Nexstar-Tegna Merger Litigation, requiring hold-separate relief notwithstanding prior DOJ and FCC approval of the acquisition and raising important questions about state parens patriae standing and the scope of injunctive relief; (2) the Eastern District of New York’s decision in Phhhoto Inc. v. Meta Platforms, allowing monopolization claims to proceed based on allegations of API termination, algorithmic suppression, and misappropriation of confidential information; (3) the Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Crop Inputs Antitrust Litigation, dismissing conspiracy claims for failure to allege sufficiently parallel conduct; (4) the Northern District of California’s partial denial of summary judgment in In re Telescopes Antitrust Litigation, allowing price-fixing and conspiracy-to-monopolize claims to proceed, while dismissing the Section 7 claim as time-barred; (5) the District of Delaware’s denial in part and grant in part of a motion to dismiss monopolization counterclaims in ZoomInfo Technologies v. Zenleads, treating an alleged misinformation campaign directed at customers as potentially exclusionary conduct; and (6) the District of Connecticut’s partial grant and denial of summary judgment in In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litigation, finding sufficient evidence of conspiracy as to Defendant Amneal regarding its drug phenytoin while granting judgment on broader allegations.
In re Nexstar-Tegna Merger Litig. (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026)
(Product market; preliminary injunction against merger; State parens patriae standing)
On April 17, 2026, Chief Judge Troy Nunley of the Eastern District of California granted a preliminary injunction requiring Nexstar to hold separate the assets of TEGNA pending trial. The transaction had already closed following investigations by both the Department of Justice and the FCC. Nevertheless, the court concluded that DIRECTV and a coalition of state attorneys general were likely to succeed on their claim that the merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Plaintiffs alleged that the acquisition would substantially increase Nexstar’s bargaining leverage over multichannel video programming distributors such as DIRECTV. By acquiring additional Big Four affiliates in numerous Designated Market Areas (“DMAs”), Nexstar would be able to threaten blackouts affecting multiple major network stations rather than a single station. According to Plaintiffs, this increased leverage would allow Nexstar to obtain higher fees from distributors, which would pass on those increases to consumers. Plaintiffs also alleged that the merger would reduce the output and quality of local news programming through newsroom consolidation. Whether the merger would in fact increase bargaining leverage depended on a central economic dispute regarding the relationship among local television affiliates.
Plaintiffs and Defendants disputed the economics of retransmission-consent bargaining. Plaintiffs argued that different Big Four affiliates within a DMA are substitutes from the perspective of distributors such as DIRECTV. Under that view, combining ownership of multiple affiliates increases bargaining leverage because a distributor that loses one station can partially mitigate the loss by relying on another. Defendants advanced the opposite view, arguing that local affiliates are complements because distributors generally seek to carry all major network affiliates.
Both parties appear to have accepted that two stations would be substitutes from DIRECTV’s perspective if the loss of one makes the other more valuable, and complements if the loss of one makes the others less valuable. For instance, one reason the loss of one station might make others more valuable is if some DIRECTV customers would respond to a blackout of one affiliate by shifting their viewing to another local affiliate. In that circumstance, ownership of multiple affiliates can give a broadcaster greater bargaining leverage because it would place under common ownership stations that otherwise provide partial alternatives to one another.
By contrast, the loss of one station may make other stations less valuable if viewers largely regard the major local affiliates as a package and would respond to the loss of any one affiliate by abandoning DIRECTV altogether. In that circumstance, common ownership could reduce fees because the owner would internalize the fact that raising the price of one affiliate can reduce demand for its commonly owned affiliates as well.
Whether local affiliates function primarily as substitutes or complements from the perspective of distributors such as DIRECTV is ultimately an empirical question. The court, in ruling for the Plaintiffs, cited DIRECTV testimony that it generally pays higher fees when station groups control multiple affiliates in the same market and noted that multiple distributors had opposed the transaction. The court viewed that evidence as more consistent with Plaintiffs’ substitutes theory than Defendants’ complements theory.
The court further found that licenses to broadcast Big Four network stations constitute the relevant product market and that individual DMAs constitute the relevant geographic markets. The court further concluded that the merger would significantly increase concentration levels in 31 DMAs, exceeding structural presumptions of illegality under the 2023 Merger Guidelines. Relying heavily on Nexstar’s internal documents, investor communications, and evidence concerning prior newsroom consolidations, the court found a likelihood that the merger would increase fees (and in turn consumer prices) and reduce local news output.
A key component of the case is that it reflects the growing importance of state attorneys general in merger enforcement and courts’ willingness to discount federal agency approval or determinations. Two separate federal regulators had reviewed the transaction. DOJ issued a Second Request before terminating its investigation, and the FCC ultimately approved the transaction after multiple waivers (including on the FCC’s national TV ownership cap) and enforceable commitments from Nexstar (to continue investing in journalism). Despite this, the court seemingly discounted the FCC’s analysis altogether. It emphasized that the FCC is not an antitrust enforcer and seemingly used that as a reason to give no deference to the agency’s conclusions. The court also highlighted the “unusual circumstances” surrounding the FCC approval process, including public statements by President Trump encouraging approval of the transaction.
Nexstar has appealed, but notably is not seeking outright reversal of the preliminary injunction. Instead, Nexstar focuses on two narrower issues. First, it argues that the nationwide hold-separate order is overbroad because the alleged competitive concerns involve only 31 DMAs. According to Nexstar, a more tailored injunction could have preserved competition in those markets while allowing the realization of merger efficiencies elsewhere.
Second, Nexstar challenges the states’ parens patriae standing. It argues that the states have not asserted any legally protected interest independent from private parties like DIRECTV, nor any sufficiently widespread injury to their citizens. This argument will prove particularly important as states continue to challenge mergers under the federal antitrust laws even where federal agencies decline to do so.
Phhhoto Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026)
(Refusal to deal; access to Defendant’s technology platform)
The Eastern District of New York allowed key aspects of Phhhoto’s monopolization claim against Meta to proceed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleges that Meta used its control over Facebook and Instagram to suppress a nascent competitor in the market for personal social networking (“PSN”).
Phhhoto, a now-defunct photo-sharing app, alleged that Meta engaged in a campaign to neutralize it as a nascent competitive threat. The complaint alleged several forms of purportedly anticompetitive conduct, including the termination of access to Instagram’s Find Friends API, restrictions on Instagram’s hashtags, Meta’s launch of a “clone” tool called Boomerang, algorithmic suppression of Phhhoto content, and efforts to recruit Phhhoto employees. According to Phhhoto, these actions collectively deprived it of users and ultimately drove the company out of business in 2017.
In an earlier appeal concerning the statute of limitations, the Second Circuit found that Phhhoto had adequately pled equitable tolling for its claims. Phhhoto Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 123 F.4th 592 (2d Cir. 2024). After filing an amended complaint, the only remaining claim before the district court was Phhhoto’s Section 2 monopolization claim.
The court first held that Phhhoto plausibly alleged a relevant market consisting of PSN services. At the pleading stage, the court accepted distinctions between PSN platforms and other digital services such as professional networking sites, video-sharing apps such as TikTok and YouTube, messaging applications, and information-sharing platforms. This is consistent with other cases evaluating a network for PSN at the pleading stage, but notably conflicts with Judge Boasberg’s finding after a bench trial that YouTube and TikTok compete in the market with Instagram and Facebook. FTC v. Meta, 811 F. Supp. 3d 67, 95 (D.D.C. 2025). The Eastern District of New York cited Judge Boasberg’s decision, but held that it would not evaluate potential competitors’ current uses to invalidate Phhhoto’s market definition for claims based on conduct in 2014–2017. Judge Boasberg, on the other hand, looked at the current state of competition after concluding that to obtain an injunction under the FTC Act, the “FTC must prove a current or imminent legal violation,” as Section 13(b) is “always forward facing.” Meta, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 88.
The court’s discussion of Phhhoto’s monopoly power allegations is particularly interesting. The court rejected Phhhoto’s purported showing of “direct” monopoly power, noting that while courts have recognized that this direct showing of power is “theoretically possible,” courts have not explained how it can be plausibly alleged at the motion to dismiss stage. The court went on to reject Phhhoto’s allegations as insufficient because they were not supported by any “empirical evidence” and lacked sufficient factual detail, such as a comparison of Meta’s “pricing” to its closest competitors. This will hopefully curb the recent trend of plaintiffs purporting to allege “direct” power based on conclusory allegations of supracompetitive pricing. The court went on to find Phhhoto’s allegations of indirect monopoly power sufficient, which Meta did not dispute (instead relying on market definition and exclusionary conduct arguments).
The court’s treatment of Meta’s refusal-to-deal arguments is also especially noteworthy. Meta argued that the complaint amounted to an impermissible refusal-to-deal claim similar to those rejected in other recent platform antitrust cases, including against Meta involving similar claims. The court disagreed. Unlike a case in which a rival seeks access to a monopolist’s platform, Phhhoto alleged that Meta pursued integration discussions with Phhhoto as a pretext to learn competitively sensitive information and then launch its own competing application —it was not merely a case about a plaintiff who was denied access to the defendant’s technology, platform, or infrastructure.
While Phhhoto had alleged five categories of wrongful conduct, the court allowed Phhhoto’s claim to proceed on only three of them. Phhhoto’s claim based on Meta’s failure to complete a proposed Facebook newsfeed integration did not survive. The court viewed Meta’s decision to integrate with another provider instead of Phhhoto to be a legitimate business choice that was not actionable. Similarly, the court dismissed allegations concerning Instagram’s removal of pre-populated hashtags and Meta’s attempted recruitment of two Phhhoto engineers. In the court’s view, the complaint failed to overcome Meta’s stated justification for the hashtag change, and the unsuccessful recruitment efforts resembled ordinary competition for talent rather than exclusionary conduct.
Three categories of conduct, however, survived dismissal and will form the basis of Phhhoto’s case as it proceeds.
First, the court held that the termination of Phhhoto’s access to Instagram’s Find Friends API was actionable. The complaint alleged that Meta withdrew access without identifying any policy violation and that a Meta representative stated the company was upset that Phhhoto was growing through Instagram. The court was rather conclusory in explaining why this conduct was actionable despite ruling that other conduct (such as the failure to complete newsfeed integration or the termination of the hashtag feature) was not. Indeed, the discontinuation of API access seems like the same type of refusal to deal that other courts have rejected as non-actionable unless the Aspen Skiing exception applies. See, e.g., New York v. Facebook, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 3d 6, 28 (D.D.C. 2021), aff’d sub nom. New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 66 F.4th 288 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The court was seemingly moved by the Meta employees’ comment that suggested that the APIs were specifically withdrawn from Phhhoto because Meta was unhappy with Phhhoto’s growth on Instagram.
Second, the court found the allegations surrounding Meta’s Boomerang sufficient to proceed. Meta allegedly obtained confidential information during integration discussions and then launched a functionally indistinguishable product and pulled out of integration discussions.
Third, the court allowed the algorithmic suppression claim to proceed. Phhhoto alleged that changes to Instagram’s feed-ranking system systematically disadvantaged content associated with the application and coincided with sharp declines in user growth and engagement. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that the algorithm was used to suppress a competitive threat. This ruling presents some risk for defendants operating algorithms, as a plaintiff can almost always conjure up allegations —whether supportable or not— that a “black box” algorithm is to blame for its poor performance on the defendant’s platform. But a key factual distinction is that, according to the complaint, one of Meta’s own employees told Phhhoto that its experience on Instagram was “strange” and suggested that Meta had “flagged” and “downranked” Phhhoto’s account.
In re Crop Inputs Antitrust Litig., 172 F.4th 570, 575 (8th Cir. 2026)
(Conspiracy; parallel conduct; group pleading)
The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a putative antitrust class action alleging that major agricultural manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers conspired to boycott agricultural e-commerce platforms and suppress price transparency. The court held that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a Section 1 conspiracy because there were insufficient allegations of parallel conduct by Defendants. Allegations of motive, opportunity to conspire, trade association membership, and generalized references to groups of Defendants were deemed insufficient to state a plausible conspiracy claim.
The Plaintiffs —several farms and farmers— alleged that manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of crop inputs (seeds and crop-protection products) coordinated to exclude emerging e-commerce platforms. Plaintiffs alleged that these e-commerce platforms threatened Defendants by affording greater price transparency and direct online sales for farmers. The district court dismissed the Sherman Act claim with prejudice, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. While ostensibly a routine affirmance of an inadequate conspiracy claim, there are four noteworthy takeaways from the decision.
First, the court disregarded allegations addressed only to groups of defendants, such as “Manufacturer Defendants,” “Wholesaler Defendants,” and “Retailer Defendants,” rather than any particular entity or entities. This type of group pleading failed to adequately allege the “who, did what, to whom (or with whom), where, and when” that is required for a plausible conspiracy claim against particular Defendants.
Second, the decision rejected Plaintiffs’ allegations as insufficient to establish parallel conduct, without evaluating “plus factors,” by carefully parsing the specific conduct alleged. The court refused to evaluate the allegedly parallel conduct at a high level of generality (e.g., that multiple Defendants tried to undermine e-commerce platforms). Instead, the court looked at the specific conduct alleged (e.g., that one Defendant sent a letter discouraging farmers from using e-commerce platforms by claiming they do not return any profits to farmers, while another Defendant claimed that these platforms would deliver counterfeit products). The court found the specific actions alleged were too dissimilar in timing, substance, and effect to constitute parallel conduct.
Third, the court essentially gave no weight to Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants participated in industry groups and trade associations, and attended conferences that created an opportunity to conspire. Plaintiffs had merely alleged an opportunity for collusion, rather than alleging particular meetings, attendees, and communications that plausibly showed parallel conduct.
Finally, the court ignored Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ Canadian counterparts conspired in Canada. According to the court, while evidence of foreign-market collusion may constitute a plus factor, it is not relevant for the threshold showing of parallel conduct, which must be made in the market at issue.
Overall, Crop Inputs is a strong reaffirmation that a Sherman Act conspiracy must be pled by plausibly alleging an agreement or pleading parallel conduct that, when evaluated at a granular level, is similar in time, manner, and effect.
In re Telescopes Antitrust Litigation (N.D. Cal. April 27, 2026)
(MSJ granted in part, denied in part, price-fixing, market allocation, conspiracy to monopolize)
In June 2020, a class of direct purchaser Plaintiffs sued various individuals and entities involved in the manufacturing and distribution of telescopes, alleging a long-running conspiracy involving price fixing, market allocation, monopolization, and related conduct surrounding the acquisition of rival telescope manufacturer Meade, in violation of Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, Clayton Act section 7, California’s Cartwright Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). A set of Defendants associated with Synta moved for summary judgment and, in April 2026, the court granted summary judgment on certain counts and with respect to certain individuals, while denying summary judgment on the balance of counts.
This matter follows on from previous litigation. In 2019, a jury found Ningbo Sunny to be liable and awarded plaintiff Orion (a distributor) $16.8 million, which was then trebled. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Orion case spawned both an indirect purchaser case, which reached a settlement in April 2025, and the direct purchaser case discussed here. All three matters involve similar allegations, namely that Synta and Ningbo Sunny, who are alleged to collectively sell at least 80% of telescopes sold in the United States, coordinated prices, product offerings, and other business decisions, despite being nominally independent. To take one example from the Orion trial, Orion alleged that Ningbo Sunny’s 2013 acquisition of Meade —an acquisition that plaintiffs alleged Synta facilitated after concluding that a Synta-Meade merger was unlikely to survive FTC review— formed part of the broader conspiracy alleged between Ningbo Sunny and Synta.
In the present direct purchaser case, a group of individuals and entities associated with Synta moved for summary judgment on all counts.
The court granted summary judgment on all claims relating to one Defendant (David Anderson, a former CEO of a Synta-owned distributor, Celestron), finding insufficient evidence of that individual’s involvement in communications between Ningbo Sunny and Synta to create a triable dispute of fact. The court further granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Clayton Act claim after finding the 2013 Ningbo Sunny/Meade merger to be time-barred. The court denied summary judgment as to the Section 1, Section 2, Cartwright Act, and UCL claims against the remaining Defendants.
Beginning with Section 1 claims, two sets of Defendants moved for summary judgment. First, a group of current and former Celestron employees (including Anderson) moved for summary judgment on the basis of insufficient evidence that they participated in the conspiracy. The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to create a dispute of fact as to their involvement in a conspiracy. This evidence included, for example, Celestron’s current CEO receiving prices Ningbo Sunny charged other distributors and receiving an email stating that “Synta is Sunny’s sales arm.” However, in denying summary judgment, the court agreed with Defendants that merely being copied on an email is insufficient on its own to show participation in a conspiracy.
Second, a group of individuals and entities associated with Celestron/Synta (the “Celestron Defendants”) raised various arguments, all of which were denied except as to Anderson (discussed above). The court found: (1) sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact that each Defendant was separately involved in the alleged conspiracy, without the need to impute liability to a subsidiary on the basis of a parent’s conduct; (2) sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact regarding coordination between Celestron and Ningbo Sunny, despite Defendants’ claims that Ningbo Sunny operated in a “manufacturing” market and Celestron in a separate “distribution” market; (3) that Plaintiffs need not show inherently wrongful conduct by individuals alleged to have directly participated in the conspiracy; and (4) that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)’s explicit exclusion of “import trade” meant that the FTAIA did not apply.
With regard to the Section 2 claims, the Celestron employees argued the claims failed because Copperweld bars conspiracy to monopolize claims, because individual employees are incapable of monopolization, and because they did not engage in inherently wrongful conduct. The Celestron Defendants argued that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently defined the market or shown evidence of monopoly power.
Regarding the employees’ claims, the court found: (1) Copperweld is inapplicable because Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy between Synta/Celestron and Ningbo Sunny, which are separately owned; (2) that corporate officers may face individual liability where they knowingly participate in conduct constituting monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize; and (3) that sufficient evidence of inherently wrongful conduct existed, including evidence that the employees assisted Celestron’s Executive Committee in price fixing, allocating the market, and conspiring to monopolize.
Regarding the Celestron Defendants’ claims, the court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged two markets, an upstream manufacturing market and a downstream distribution market. It further held that Plaintiffs’ evidence of market shares, concentration, and barriers to entry was sufficient to create a triable issue regarding monopoly power.
The decision is noteworthy less for any novel legal rule than for its application of the summary judgment standard to a sprawling conspiracy theory involving vertically related firms, family-controlled affiliates, and a prior acquisition. The court largely concluded that disputes regarding participation in the alleged conspiracy, market power, and the relationship between Synta and Ningbo Sunny present triable issues for a jury. The principal defense victories were dismissal of the time-barred Section 7 claim and summary judgment in favor of former Celestron executive David Anderson.
ZoomInfo Technologies LLC v. Zenleads Inc. (D. Del. May 6, 2026)
(MTD granted in part: monopolization, patent acquisitions, disparagement of rival)
ZoomInfo and Apollo are both providers of sales intelligence data used by businesses to identify and contact potential customers. In March 2025, ZoomInfo sued Apollo for patent infringement. In January 2026, Apollo filed counterclaims alleging monopolization, false advertising, deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference. ZoomInfo moved to dismiss Apollo’s counterclaims, and on May 6, 2026, the court granted ZoomInfo’s motion with respect to its deceptive trade practices claims and denied the rest.
Turning first to Apollo’s monopolization allegations, Apollo alleged ZoomInfo to have monopoly power in the U.S. market for sales intelligence data based on an alleged “dominant” market share, high prices (alleged to be far above Apollo’s prices for a comparable product), and the alleged existence of entry barriers (including high startup costs, high software development costs, and customers locked into ZoomInfo). Apollo alleged ZoomInfo to have maintained its monopoly power by acquiring many of its competitors over the past decade, helping it to consolidate customers, eliminate rivals, and obtain patents that could be asserted against rivals.
On patents, Apollo seems to have alleged that acquiring but not using patents is evidence of anticompetitive exclusion, alleging ZoomInfo to be “a non-practicing patent holder with monopoly power that wields the patents with the intent to exclude,” by harassing competitors and raising their costs, including by suing Apollo itself for patent violations. ZoomInfo argued that patent assertion is a routine and lawful business practice, and that Apollo’s theory regarding patents was barred by Noerr-Pennington.
On spreading fear, uncertainty, and doubt, Apollo alleged that LinkedIn posts written by then-current and former ZoomInfo employees communicated false and misleading information to Apollo’s potential customers, specifically alleging that following LinkedIn’s temporary de-listing of Apollo’s corporate page, the individuals made posts accusing Apollo of theft, “unethical greed,” and “scraping instead of sourcing,” and that at least 12 ZoomInfo employees “liked,” “reposted,” or otherwise reacted to the posts, which served to drive user engagement with the posts. Apollo further alleged that ZoomInfo made false statements about Apollo in email communications with ZoomInfo customers, including that Apollo sources “non-compliant data,” posing risks to customers.
The court, in denying ZoomInfo’s motion to dismiss Apollo’s Section 2 claims, found that Apollo had plausibly alleged that ZoomInfo had engaged in anticompetitive conduct, citing allegations that a specific customer “expressly declined to retain Apollo due to misrepresentations that ZoomInfo made,” with the customer instead switching to ZoomInfo at a higher price, and allegations that ZoomInfo was a dominant player in competition with Apollo. The court did not squarely resolve whether the allegations related to patents could independently support liability, instead concluding that Apollo had plausibly alleged anticompetitive conduct when the various allegations were viewed collectively.
Apollo’s allegations of false advertising and tortious interference are based on a similar set of facts as the monopolization allegations, specifically the LinkedIn posts and reactions of then-current and former ZoomInfo employees, and a limited set of ZoomInfo’s emails with customers. ZoomInfo argued that posts by employees do not constitute commercial speech and that the posts were neither factually false nor material. It further argued that its customer communications were private and not widely disseminated. The court (in accepting Apollo’s allegations as true for the purposes of adjudicating a motion to dismiss) found that Apollo had plausibly alleged that ZoomInfo made false or misleading statements, which deceived its audience and influenced purchasing decisions in a way that likely injured Apollo. Having reached this conclusion, the court denied ZoomInfo’s motion to dismiss Apollo’s Lanham Act and tortious interference allegations.
The court dismissed with leave to amend a count alleging a violation of Delaware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, after finding that Apollo failed to identify which of the 12 subsections of the Act were allegedly violated.
While Apollo’s claims have largely survived for the time being, Apollo may face difficulties in successfully litigating them. The intended purpose of patents is to prevent competition between the patent holder and rivals, as while this erodes static competition, it promotes dynamic competition by incentivizing the innovation that can lead to patents, and courts have been hesitant to condemn activity related to patenting and patent enforcement as anticompetitive, outside of sham litigation, which does not appear to be alleged here. And even if spreading fear, uncertainty, and doubt against a rival could rise to the level of anticompetitive harm in certain rare circumstances, proving such a theory may ultimately require substantially stronger evidence of market-wide exclusionary effects than the limited set of LinkedIn posts and customer communications identified in the complaint. The most notable aspect of the decision may be its willingness, at least at the pleading stage, to treat an alleged misinformation campaign directed at customers as potentially exclusionary conduct under Section 2.
In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litigation (D. Conn. April 15, 2026)
(MSJ granted in part, denied in part, price fixing, bid rigging, market allocation)
On April 15, 2026, a Connecticut district court granted in part and denied in part Amneal’s motion for summary judgment on all claims that it participated in a conspiracy with dozens of other pharmaceutical firms to elevate the prices of scores of different generic drugs. The case is related to one of three similar matters being brought by state attorneys general. Defendant drug companies had previously jointly sought summary judgment. However, the court rejected this on the grounds that there is evidence in the record that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the alleged overarching conspiracy exists. This ruling did not affirm that this was the case for each individual drug company. As a result, individual drug companies’ separate motions for summary judgment on whether they specifically had participated in the conspiracy could proceed.
Amneal is a global drug supplier. This particular matter focused extensively on its role as a supplier of phenytoin, an oral treatment for epilepsy. Amneal argued that the record showed that far from trying to allocate the market, it was actively exploring giving up one of its two major customers so as to ensure its ability to adequately supply the other (at a higher price). Amneal was potentially interested in losing a customer because it struggled to adequately supply both customers, and there were penalties for failing to supply.
Amneal contemplated raising its price as a means of leading a customer to move away. However, according to the court, the record indicated that Amneal’s deliberations may not have been made in isolation. Specifically, during the period when Amneal was engaged in negotiations with its phenytoin clients, its executives were also in repeated contact with other manufacturers of the drug. Moreover, email records indicate that Amneal and the other drug manufacturers were discussing phenytoin pricing. (The details of phone and potential in-person communications were not available because the various parties invoked the Fifth Amendment.) And ultimately, Amneal kept both customers at elevated prices.
The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Amneal conspired with its rivals to increase prices for that drug. As a result, its motion for summary judgment on claims relating to phenytoin was denied. However, there was no equivalent evidentiary basis to establish that Amneal had conspired outside of the narrow context of phenytoin pricing as part of a larger arrangement implicating a variety of different medications. Unlike in the case of another specific pharmaceutical firm (Aurobindo), there was no cooperating witness willing to testify for the States that Amneal had been actively conspiring on multiple drugs. Moreover, the record contained some statements from competitors that Amneal was actually “very, very aggressive when it came to market share,” cutting against the argument of a broader conspiracy. Consequently, the court concluded that there was no basis that would convince a reasonable jury of its participation more broadly.
Jeremy Kauffman, Jeremy Sandford, Nathan Wilson, and Koren W. Wong-Ervin[1]
[1] The authors thank Ryan Kosches and Colette Puleo for their research assistance. The views and opinions set forth herein are the personal views or opinions of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the organizations with which they are affiliated, or those organizations’ management, affiliates, employees, or clients. Jones Day and Econic Partners represent or otherwise work with a number of clients that may have an interest in the subject matter of this article. This publication was not funded or sponsored.