Market power can be assessed in antitrust cases by two methods often described as “alternatives”. For unilateral conduct, however, they are inconsistent. Courts insist on market shares well above 50%, which entails that only one firm can be a monopolist. Direct measures by examining price-cost margins, however, can sometimes produce two or more “monopolists” in...Read More

The European Union’s recent wave of digital regulations, especially the Digital Services Act (DSA), highlights a strategic use of law as an instrument of industrial policy and global digital influence. While China has explicitly cultivated national technology champions through state-led industrial policy, the United States has largely relied on market-driven innovation and occasional strategic interventions...Read More

“Great nations” rivalry includes all aspects of economic rivalry, so it is natural that the great nations consider antitrust a weapon in their arsenals, particularly in areas such as military, technology, culture, and finance. While some strategic use (and abuse) of antitrust is probably unavoidable, judicious deployment of competition law principles by great nations can...Read More

This article addresses three interrelated questions, namely: back to the basics, what are industrial policies? Granted that, is a new return of industrial policies actually in the making? And finally, what is there to be done? I argue that current “industrial policies” fall well short of any public intervention which (a) defines the boundaries between...Read More

The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) uses per se prohibitions to regulate “gatekeepers,” prioritising rapid enforcement over case-specific effects analysis. This article assesses whether, despite the absence of a formal efficiency defence, certain efficiencies—particularly those enhancing contestability—can influence DMA procedures. We identify limited entry points, such as proportionality in compliance measures, remedy design, enforcement priorities,...Read More