Market power can be assessed in antitrust cases by two methods often described as “alternatives”. For unilateral conduct, however, they are inconsistent. Courts insist on market shares well above 50%, which entails that only one firm can be a monopolist. Direct measures by examining price-cost margins, however, can sometimes produce two or more “monopolists” in the same market. Such outcomes are inconsistent with the historic and economic meaning of “monopoly”.

ANTITRUST

DIGITAL LAW

COMPLEXITY SCIENCE

LATEST PUBLICATIONS

Reading suggestions – November 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include post-profit antitrust, anticompetitive directors, the dynamic competition approach, Moore's Law, GenAI...

EU Digital Regulation as Industry Shaping Policy: The DSA, Brussels Effect, and Global Competitiveness

The European Union’s recent wave of digital regulations, especially the Digital Services Act (DSA), highlights a strategic use of law...

The Rise of Industrial Policy in Europe and the Search for Growth and Innovation: A Golden Opportunity for Competition Authorities

This paper argues that the unintended and unanticipated costs of globalization revealed during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020...

AI, Data, And Leveraging Strategies: Implications For Antitrust

In product markets that rely heavily on artificial intelligence (AI), firms both use data and generate data. For a multiproduct...

Antitrust and Great Powers Rivalry

“Great nations” rivalry includes all aspects of economic rivalry, so it is natural that the great nations consider antitrust a...

China and the Paradox of Protectionism?

This special issue examines the coexistence of industrial and competition policy in a period of geopolitical rivalry and rapid technological...

Industrial Policy and Competitiveness: Non-Tariff Barriers and Incentives to Innovate

Countries use non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as instruments of industrial policy. NTBs often are difficult to observe and hard to adjust...

A Return of Industrial Policies? Only a Partial and Dystopic One

This article addresses three interrelated questions, namely: back to the basics, what are industrial policies? Granted that, is a new...

Special Issue: Industrial Policy and Competitiveness

This special issue examines the coexistence of industrial and competition policy in a period of geopolitical rivalry and rapid technological...

Competition Stories: January 2025 – June 2025

This issue presents recent developments in EU competition law enforcement in digital markets. It examines the European Commission’s first non-compliance...

Reading suggestions – October 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include economic analysis in the DMA, justice automated by AI, the innovation...

An effects-based approach to the DMA?

The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) uses per se prohibitions to regulate “gatekeepers,” prioritising rapid enforcement over case-specific effects analysis....

US Antitrust Cases

By Koren W. Wong-Ervin

EU Competition Cases

By Alice Setari and Mario Siragusa

Latin American Cases

By Marcela Mattiuzzo

TECH MONOPOLY

BY HERBERT HOVENKAMP

Crane's Cartel

By Daniel Crane

SPECIAL GUESTS

Academics Only