US antitrust law has traditionally paid little attention to global competitiveness and industrial policy objectives. This reflects a commitment to enabling the free play of competitive forces to determine market outcomes and an aversion to protectionist policies that may favor inefficient “national champions.” These assumptions are challenged in a global marketplace where China has pursued long-standing mercantilist policies to secure geopolitical objectives in strategically critical industries. When state-backed mercantilism distorts competitive conditions and international-trade institutions do not provide an effective...

ANTITRUST

DIGITAL LAW

COMPLEXITY SCIENCE

LATEST PUBLICATIONS

Antitrust and Great Powers Rivalry

“Great nations” rivalry includes all aspects of economic rivalry, so it is natural that the great nations consider antitrust a...

China and the Paradox of Protectionism?

This special issue examines the coexistence of industrial and competition policy in a period of geopolitical rivalry and rapid technological...

Industrial Policy and Competitiveness: Non-Tariff Barriers and Incentives to Innovate

Countries use non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as instruments of industrial policy. NTBs often are difficult to observe and hard to adjust...

A Return of Industrial Policies? Only a Partial and Dystopic One

This article addresses three interrelated questions, namely: back to the basics, what are industrial policies? Granted that, is a new...

Special Issue: Industrial Policy and Competitiveness

This special issue examines the coexistence of industrial and competition policy in a period of geopolitical rivalry and rapid technological...

Competition Stories: January 2025 – June 2025

This issue presents recent developments in EU competition law enforcement in digital markets. It examines the European Commission’s first non-compliance...

Reading suggestions – October 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include economic analysis in the DMA, justice automated by AI, the innovation...

An effects-based approach to the DMA?

The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) uses per se prohibitions to regulate “gatekeepers,” prioritising rapid enforcement over case-specific effects analysis....

Antitrust Antidote: June-September 2025

There were a number of decisions from June through September 2025 including: (1) a fifth recent decision (U.S. et al....

The Future-Proof Fantasy of AI Regulation

The EU’s quest for “future-proof” AI regulation is a fantasy. AI evolves through emergent properties that defy prediction, yet Brussels...

Reading suggestions – September 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include the DMA’s impacts on EU users, killer acquisitions, auditable AI systems,...

Principal-Agent Dynamics and Digital (Platform) Economics in the Age of Agentic AI

This article applies the principal–agent framework to the use of autonomous AI systems in digital markets. It examines the challenge...

US Antitrust Cases

By Koren W. Wong-Ervin

EU Competition Cases

By Alice Setari and Mario Siragusa

Latin American Cases

By Marcela Mattiuzzo

TECH MONOPOLY

BY HERBERT HOVENKAMP

Crane's Cartel

By Daniel Crane

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