The challenges of the global landscape and new market realities, significantly led by the digital sector and AI development, are poised to shape competition policy and call for an unprecedented level of inter-policy coordination. This scenario gives rise to a new legal ecosystem of competition, what one can refer to as competition 2.0, an integrated and complementary approach between public policies, necessary to deliver the best outcomes for consumers. Competition 2.0. expands the potential of competition and better public policies,...

ANTITRUST

DIGITAL LAW

COMPLEXITY SCIENCE

LATEST PUBLICATIONS

The Regulation that Cried Wolf: Generative AI Training Data and the Challenge of Lawful Scale

This essay examines how the EU’s Digital Markets Act unintentionally reshapes the foundations of generative AI. By barring gatekeepers from...

Artificial Intelligence and Data Policies: Regulatory Overlaps and Economic Tradeoffs

The Network Law Review is pleased to present a special issue entitled “The Law & Technology & Economics of AI.”...

Toward Compliance Zero: AI and the Vanishing Costs of Regulatory Compliance

AI systems now perform core compliance tasks once reserved for humans. Prof. Ohm argues that this will drive the marginal...

Reading suggestions – August 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include AI openness, how AI improves itself, the unintended consequences of privacy...

Special issue on “The Law & Technology & Economics of AI”

Regulators across the globe are rushing to ramp up their regulatory frameworks to rein in and deal with Big Tech...

Reading suggestions – July 2025

Here are Thibault Schrepel’s monthly reading suggestions. Topics include the economics of online default positions, what ant colonies can teach...

How Employee Networks Drive Innovation, and How Remote Work Alters Both

Our research examines how employee collaboration networks within companies affect the quality of innovation, using data from over 28,000 employees...

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Merger Efficiency “Defense”

Firms’ principal motives for merging are not to increase market power, but rather to improve firm outcomes through changes in...

The Counterintuitive Economics of Default Positions

Which supplier should control the default slot on digital devices? We analyze alternative ways to assign the default position for...

EU Competition Law

By Makis Komninos

TECH MONOPOLY

BY HERBERT HOVENKAMP

SPECIAL GUESTS

Academics Only

Crane's Cartel

By Daniel Crane

DigiConsumers

By Catalina Goanta

Antitrust Antidote

By Koren W. Wong-Ervin

GUEST PROFESSORS